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Trust & security

Your data, secured and never shared.

A plain-language account of how InvoTax protects your invoices and business data, the small set of companies that ever touch it, and the handful of things we are still finishing -- because we would rather tell you the truth than round up.

Last reviewed:

In plain language

Your invoices and documents are encrypted.
Every document InvoTax stores is sealed with AES-256-GCM (a current, widely trusted encryption standard also used by major cloud providers) before it touches disk, and it is bound to your organization’s identity so a sealed file cannot be swapped between customers or document types even if someone obtained raw storage access.
Your data is walled off from every other customer at the database level.
Not just in the application code: every tenant table in our database enforces row-level security that PostgreSQL itself will not let anyone bypass -- including from a bug in our own application code. This is checked automatically by two independent, continuously-running tests.
Access to your account is protected by strong authentication.
Every password must be at least 12 characters. Two-factor authentication (an authenticator app code) is available for your team members and mandatory for our own support/operations staff -- nobody on our staff can act on your account without it. You can revoke any of your team’s active sessions at any time.
Only the minimum required data reaches Qatar’s tax authority (GTA).
InvoTax sends only the structured invoice fields the e-invoicing regulation requires -- never your full documents, attachments, or unrelated business data.
We never sell or share your data with advertisers or analytics companies.
We do not run any analytics, advertising, or tracking vendor in the product today (verified directly in the code, not just policy). The only outside companies that ever see any of your data are the small, necessary set listed below -- your cloud/edge network provider and our email delivery provider (for message delivery only, never invoice content) -- plus the tax authority itself, which is a legal requirement, not a choice.

We are honest about what is still in progress

  • Backups run nightly, verified before old copies are deleted, and mirrored to two independent drives but they are not yet copied off the physical machine, so a fire or theft at the server’s location is not yet covered. This is our top-priority open item (see the roadmap below).
  • Our tamper-evident audit trail (every sensitive action is chained cryptographically, like a mini blockchain) is built and can be verified but that verification does not yet run automatically on a schedule. We will fix this soon.
  • Our support staff can, for the sole purpose of verifying your business registration (Commercial Registration, Tax Card, QID, Establishment Card) during onboarding, view the documents you submitted for that review and every decision they make on those documents is attributed to a named staff member and timestamped. Support staff have no access to your ongoing invoices or day-to-day documents; there is no code path that grants it.
  • Our web application’s security headers are in place with one exception explained honestly in the table below (a content-security policy that is currently monitoring rather than blocking).

Technical assurance table

"In place" means built, deployed and verified in the current codebase. "Partial" means built but incomplete, not automatic, or not enforcing. "Planned" means decided and designed but not yet built.

Per the source review: 21 controls in place, 5 partial, 6 planned.

ControlStatusHonest detail
Archive encryption at restIn placeAES-256-GCM, random nonce per document, authenticated binding to tenant+document+kind (prevents cross-tenant/cross-document swap). One rotating platform keyring (not a separate key per tenant) -- see the honest note below the table.
Encryption key handlingIn placeKeys are supplied only via environment variables on the API host, never stored in the database; a raw/placeholder key is rejected at boot; a random ephemeral key is used in dev/test and is refused if a production profile is active.
Transport encryption (TLS)In placeAll public hostnames are proxied through Cloudflare with TLS 1.2+ termination, then reach the application over an outbound-only encrypted tunnel (no inbound ports exposed on the server).
Security response headers -- APIIn placeHSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, and an enforcing Content-Security-Policy are set on every API response, including error responses.
Security response headers -- web appPartialHSTS and the other headers are enforcing on the web app; the Content-Security-Policy is currently deployed in report-only (monitoring) mode, not blocking mode, on the main tenant/operator surfaces.
Tenant data isolation (row-level security)In placeEvery tenant-owned database table has row-level security forced (cannot be bypassed by any application code path). Verified by two independently-built, continuously-run automated tests.
Password strength policyIn place12-character minimum enforced as an absolute floor (no organization can configure a weaker policy).
Two-factor authentication -- our staffIn placeMandatory. A staff account without confirmed two-factor authentication can only reach the "set up 2FA" screen -- every other internal action is blocked until it is enabled.
Two-factor authentication -- your teamPartialAvailable to every tenant user; not currently mandatory.
Session revocationIn placeYou can revoke your own or your team’s active sessions at any time; the same capability exists for our internal staff sessions.
Password-reset / invite link securityIn placeReset and invite tokens are never stored in readable form -- they are stored as a keyed cryptographic hash, so a copy of the database alone cannot be used to forge a reset link.
Role-based access controlIn placePermissions are modeled as named roles plus scoped grants (e.g., limited to one business unit); editing roles/permissions is restricted to an Owner/Admin-level permission, not available to a general user.
Tamper-evident audit trail (design)In placeSensitive actions are written to a cryptographically hash-chained audit log; each entry’s integrity can be verified against the previous one.
Tamper-evident audit trail (automatic verification)PlannedThe verifier exists and is exercised in our automated tests, but it does not yet run automatically on a recurring schedule in production. This is an open, tracked item.
Backups -- creation & on-site redundancyIn placeFull database and encrypted-archive backups run nightly, are cryptographically verified (checksum + structural integrity check) before any older backup is deleted, and are mirrored to two separate on-server drives.
Backups -- off-site copyPlannedNot yet implemented. Today’s backups protect against a single-drive failure, not against loss of the physical machine itself (fire, theft). This is our current top backup priority.
Backup recovery timeIn place (partially proven)Restore has been rehearsed successfully into a disposable test environment; not yet proven at full production data volume.
GTA (tax authority) data minimizationIn placeOnly the structured invoice fields required by Qatar’s e-invoicing regulation are transmitted; uploaded attachments, sealed document blobs, and unrelated business data are never part of the submission.
Data residencyIn placeAll production data is hosted on a single server located and operated in Qatar today.
On-premise deployment optionPlannedOn-prem/self-hosted deployment is part of the product roadmap; not offered today (current customers are hosted).
Email delivery data exposureIn placeTransactional email (invites, password resets, notifications) is sent via a standard mail-relay provider; email content is subject/body text -- no invoice or document content or attachments are included.
Third-party analytics / advertising / trackingIn place (none present)No analytics, advertising, or session-tracking vendor of any kind is integrated into the product today -- checked directly against the source code, not only stated as policy.
Document retention -- invoice archiveIn placeSealed invoice/document records are retained for 10 years (matching tax record-keeping requirements) with an automatic, scheduled sweep.
Document retention -- onboarding/registration documentsPlannedDecided policy: life of the application plus 12 months, then purge. The automated deletion sweep for this category is designed but not yet built; documents are not deleted prematurely, but the scheduled purge is not yet running.
Staff access to onboarding/registration documentsIn place, narrowly scopedSupport/operations staff can view the specific documents you submit for business-registration verification (Commercial Registration, Tax Card, QID, Establishment Card) -- for that verification purpose only. Every approve/reject decision on those documents is attributed to a named staff member and timestamped.
Staff access to ongoing invoices/day-to-day documentsIn place (no access exists)There is no database permission, API endpoint, or code path that lets support/operations staff read your invoices or day-to-day document attachments. This was verified directly against the database access-control policies, not assumed.
Full audit logging of staff document views (as opposed to decisions)PartialApprove/reject decisions on registration documents are attributed and timestamped (see staff-access row above). Whether a plain "viewed this document" action is separately written into the hash-chained audit log was not fully confirmed within this review’s time budget -- flagged for follow-up rather than claimed.
Monitoring -- service healthIn placeEvery production container (API, web, database, tunnel) has an automated health check; the API exposes a health endpoint used by that monitoring.
Monitoring -- application metrics, dashboards, alertingPlannedDecided approach (reuse the existing in-house monitoring stack rather than a new vendor); the integration work (metrics export, dashboard, uptime alert) is designed but not yet built.
Application error trackingPlannedNot currently integrated; no error-tracking vendor is present in the product today.
Sandbox / demo mode data isolationIn placeEach organization can be flagged Sandbox or Live; the flag only changes invoice numbering/behavior and tax-authority sync -- it never creates a second, separately-secured environment, so the same security controls above apply in both modes.

Honest note on encryption keys: InvoTax uses one platform-wide, rotating encryption key set today, not a separate mathematically-independent key per customer. Isolation between customers’ encrypted documents is enforced by the authenticated binding described above (which makes a sealed file for one customer unusable for another even under the correct key) and the database-level row security above. If your organization requires per-tenant key material as a contractual condition, tell us -- it is not built today.

Who else can see any of your data, and why

The complete list of outside companies that ever touch any of your data -- nobody else does.

SubprocessorRoleWhat they can seeRequired or optional
Cloudflare, Inc.Network edge / TLS termination / DDoS protection for all public hostnamesEncrypted traffic metadata at the network edge, as with any CDN/reverse-proxy provider; connects to our server only through an outbound-only encrypted tunnelRequired for public access to the service
AWS SESEmail delivery provider -- sends transactional email (invites, password resets, notifications)Recipient address and message text only. Never invoice content, documents, or attachments.Required for account/notification email
Qatar General Tax Authority (GTA)Statutory recipient of e-invoicing dataOnly the structured invoice fields the regulation requiresRequired by law -- not a discretionary data share

No analytics, advertising, data-broker, or AI-training third party currently receives any customer data. We do not sell customer data, and we do not share it with anyone outside the table above.

What we will improve next

The open items behind the "Partial" and "Planned" rows above, and what closes each one.

ItemTracked asWhat will changePriority
Off-site backup copySP-1 (in progress)Add a backup destination physically separate from the server, closing the fire/theft gap that on-server mirrors don’t coverHighest -- critical severity, already in progress
Scheduled audit-chain verificationAA-4 (open)Run the existing chain verifier automatically on a recurring schedule with alerting on failureHigh
Web app Content-Security-Policy: monitoring to enforcingTracked internally alongside SP-2Flip the web application’s CSP from report-only to blocking mode once report data confirms no false positivesHigh
Application monitoring & alertingMONITOR-1 (queued)Export application metrics to the existing in-house Grafana/Prometheus stack; add an uptime alert on the public health endpointMedium
Onboarding-document retention sweepOCR-STORAGE-2 (queued)Automatic purge of registration documents at "application life + 12 months" per the decided policyMedium
Backup restore proof at full production scaleNoted as unproven at scaleRehearse a restore against production-sized data, not just the current disposable-test volumeMedium
Per-viewer audit logging for staff document accessIdentified during this reviewConfirm/close the gap between "decision logged" and "every view logged" for registration-document reviewLow-Medium

Dated as of 2026-09-23 and refreshed whenever a tracked item changes status.

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