| Archive encryption at rest | In place | AES-256-GCM, random nonce per document, authenticated binding to tenant+document+kind (prevents cross-tenant/cross-document swap). One rotating platform keyring (not a separate key per tenant) -- see the honest note below the table. |
| Encryption key handling | In place | Keys are supplied only via environment variables on the API host, never stored in the database; a raw/placeholder key is rejected at boot; a random ephemeral key is used in dev/test and is refused if a production profile is active. |
| Transport encryption (TLS) | In place | All public hostnames are proxied through Cloudflare with TLS 1.2+ termination, then reach the application over an outbound-only encrypted tunnel (no inbound ports exposed on the server). |
| Security response headers -- API | In place | HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, and an enforcing Content-Security-Policy are set on every API response, including error responses. |
| Security response headers -- web app | Partial | HSTS and the other headers are enforcing on the web app; the Content-Security-Policy is currently deployed in report-only (monitoring) mode, not blocking mode, on the main tenant/operator surfaces. |
| Tenant data isolation (row-level security) | In place | Every tenant-owned database table has row-level security forced (cannot be bypassed by any application code path). Verified by two independently-built, continuously-run automated tests. |
| Password strength policy | In place | 12-character minimum enforced as an absolute floor (no organization can configure a weaker policy). |
| Two-factor authentication -- our staff | In place | Mandatory. A staff account without confirmed two-factor authentication can only reach the "set up 2FA" screen -- every other internal action is blocked until it is enabled. |
| Two-factor authentication -- your team | Partial | Available to every tenant user; not currently mandatory. |
| Session revocation | In place | You can revoke your own or your team’s active sessions at any time; the same capability exists for our internal staff sessions. |
| Password-reset / invite link security | In place | Reset and invite tokens are never stored in readable form -- they are stored as a keyed cryptographic hash, so a copy of the database alone cannot be used to forge a reset link. |
| Role-based access control | In place | Permissions are modeled as named roles plus scoped grants (e.g., limited to one business unit); editing roles/permissions is restricted to an Owner/Admin-level permission, not available to a general user. |
| Tamper-evident audit trail (design) | In place | Sensitive actions are written to a cryptographically hash-chained audit log; each entry’s integrity can be verified against the previous one. |
| Tamper-evident audit trail (automatic verification) | Planned | The verifier exists and is exercised in our automated tests, but it does not yet run automatically on a recurring schedule in production. This is an open, tracked item. |
| Backups -- creation & on-site redundancy | In place | Full database and encrypted-archive backups run nightly, are cryptographically verified (checksum + structural integrity check) before any older backup is deleted, and are mirrored to two separate on-server drives. |
| Backups -- off-site copy | Planned | Not yet implemented. Today’s backups protect against a single-drive failure, not against loss of the physical machine itself (fire, theft). This is our current top backup priority. |
| Backup recovery time | In place (partially proven) | Restore has been rehearsed successfully into a disposable test environment; not yet proven at full production data volume. |
| GTA (tax authority) data minimization | In place | Only the structured invoice fields required by Qatar’s e-invoicing regulation are transmitted; uploaded attachments, sealed document blobs, and unrelated business data are never part of the submission. |
| Data residency | In place | All production data is hosted on a single server located and operated in Qatar today. |
| On-premise deployment option | Planned | On-prem/self-hosted deployment is part of the product roadmap; not offered today (current customers are hosted). |
| Email delivery data exposure | In place | Transactional email (invites, password resets, notifications) is sent via a standard mail-relay provider; email content is subject/body text -- no invoice or document content or attachments are included. |
| Third-party analytics / advertising / tracking | In place (none present) | No analytics, advertising, or session-tracking vendor of any kind is integrated into the product today -- checked directly against the source code, not only stated as policy. |
| Document retention -- invoice archive | In place | Sealed invoice/document records are retained for 10 years (matching tax record-keeping requirements) with an automatic, scheduled sweep. |
| Document retention -- onboarding/registration documents | Planned | Decided policy: life of the application plus 12 months, then purge. The automated deletion sweep for this category is designed but not yet built; documents are not deleted prematurely, but the scheduled purge is not yet running. |
| Staff access to onboarding/registration documents | In place, narrowly scoped | Support/operations staff can view the specific documents you submit for business-registration verification (Commercial Registration, Tax Card, QID, Establishment Card) -- for that verification purpose only. Every approve/reject decision on those documents is attributed to a named staff member and timestamped. |
| Staff access to ongoing invoices/day-to-day documents | In place (no access exists) | There is no database permission, API endpoint, or code path that lets support/operations staff read your invoices or day-to-day document attachments. This was verified directly against the database access-control policies, not assumed. |
| Full audit logging of staff document views (as opposed to decisions) | Partial | Approve/reject decisions on registration documents are attributed and timestamped (see staff-access row above). Whether a plain "viewed this document" action is separately written into the hash-chained audit log was not fully confirmed within this review’s time budget -- flagged for follow-up rather than claimed. |
| Monitoring -- service health | In place | Every production container (API, web, database, tunnel) has an automated health check; the API exposes a health endpoint used by that monitoring. |
| Monitoring -- application metrics, dashboards, alerting | Planned | Decided approach (reuse the existing in-house monitoring stack rather than a new vendor); the integration work (metrics export, dashboard, uptime alert) is designed but not yet built. |
| Application error tracking | Planned | Not currently integrated; no error-tracking vendor is present in the product today. |
| Sandbox / demo mode data isolation | In place | Each organization can be flagged Sandbox or Live; the flag only changes invoice numbering/behavior and tax-authority sync -- it never creates a second, separately-secured environment, so the same security controls above apply in both modes. |